Functional Neuroimaging Studies of Hypnosis and Meditation:  A Comparative Perspective by Dumont, Laurence et al.
58 || MBR || Volume : 2 || Issue : 1
m
br
.s
yn
er
gi
es
pr
ai
ri
es
.c
a
art ic le
Functional Neuroimaging Studies of Hypnosis and 
Meditation: A Comparative Perspective
Laurence Dumont, BA*, †; Christophe Martin, BSc*; Inge Broer, BA*
Over the last few decades, an increasing number of functional neuroimaging studies have been 
performed with respect to hypnosis and meditation. The objective of this article is to review a num-
ber of these studies to compare the neural substrates related to different components of hypnosis 
and meditation. We examine neuroimaging studies conducted to explore the impact of hypnosis on 
the brain regions and systems involved in color perception, hand paralysis, pain, and the default-
mode network (DMN). We also review neuroimaging investigations carried out to examine the 
neural correlates of various meditation techniques, as well as the effects of meditation on the brain 
mechanisms related to emotion, pain, and the DMN. Given the discrepancy existing between the 
findings from neuroimaging studies of hypnosis and meditation carried out in regard to pain and 
the DMN, we conclude that it is premature to claim that hypnosis and meditation are mediated by 
similar brain systems and neural mechanisms.
1. Introduction
Over the last few decades, an increasing number 
of functional neuroimaging studies have been 
performed in regard to hypnosis and meditation. 
The objective of this article is to review the main 
areas of the literature on both subjects in order 
to compare the neural substrates related to dif-
ferent components of hypnosis and meditation. 
In the introductory section, we provide working 
definitions of these two constructs and outline the 
framework under which they will be examined. 
In the next section, we present a series of func-
tional brain imaging studies that have been con-
ducted to investigate the impact of hypnosis on 
the brain regions and systems involved in colour 
perception, hand paralysis, pain, and the default-
mode network (DMN). In the third section, we 
review neuroimaging investigations carried out to 
examine the neural correlates of various medita-
tion techniques, as well as the effects of medita-
tion on the brain mechanisms related to emotion, 
pain, and the DMN. In the fourth and final sec-
tion, we compare findings from neuroimaging 
studies of hypnosis and meditation reviewed in 
this article (particularly related to pain and the 
DMN), and offer a few concluding remarks. 
1.1 Hypnosis
While the word ‘Hypnosis’ is a term derived from 
the Greek word ‘hypnos’ which means sleep, 
it has been shown that these two states have 
little in common when it comes to brain activ-
ity (Halsband, Mueller, Hinterberger, & Strickner, 
2009). Hypnosis is seen as either an altered state 
of consciousness or a cooperative interaction in 
which one person, the subject, becomes highly 
focused and receptive to verbal suggestions given 
by another person, the hypnotist. The subject is 
guided by the hypnotist to respond to suggestions 
for specific changes in subjective experience, sen-
sation, perception, thought, emotion, or behav-
ior. But hypnosis does not necessarily have to in-
volve another person. Hypnotic suggestions can 
also be self-administered: a hypnotic state that is 
self-created is called autohypnosis (or self-hypno-
sis) (Rainville & Price, 2003). However there are, 
to our knowledge, no fMRI studies investigating 
self-hypnosis to date. Hence this review will fo-
cus on means of hypnotic induction that include 
a hypnotist or a recording.
In order to get a clear picture of the workings 
of hypnosis in the brain, two components must be 
differentiated. The first aspect is the basic putative 
change of state following a hypnotic induction pro-
cedure without further targeted suggestions (i.e., 
neutral hypnosis). The second aspect regards the 
influence of specific suggestions provided during 
a hypnosis session. Two main types of hypnotic 
induction are recognized in the literature — relax-
ation and active/alert inductions — though most 
neuroscientific studies have concentrated on the 
former. The changes in subjective experience that 
follow relaxation-based hypnotic inductions typi-
cally include mental relaxation (i.e, becoming at 
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ease, letting go of tensions) and mental absorp-
tion (i.e., a shift from an effortful and ever chang-
ing focus of attention to the full concentration on 
a particular object, whether it be internal or ex-
ternal).  Such alterations lead to a decrease in the 
sense of time (Kroger & Yapco, 2007). Hypnosis 
can also be characterized by a reduced sense of 
self-monitoring and self-agency. This reduction is 
manifested by feelings of automaticity associated 
with thoughts or actions (Rainville & Price, 2003; 
Grant & Rainville, 2005; Price, 1996).  
1.2 Meditation
The term ‘meditation’ comes from the Latin ‘me-
ditatio’ which originally meant “to think, con-
template “. Meditation usually refers to a very 
wide range of mental techniques associated with 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions (Halsband et al., 2009). A popular 
distinction between two components present in 
meditation has been made by Lutz et al. (2008). 
These components are open monitoring (OM) 
and focused attention (FA). OM techniques in-
volve allowing any sensations, thoughts, or feel-
ings to arise and pass away from moment-to-mo-
ment, while maintaining awareness as an attentive 
and non-attached observer without judgment 
or analysis. These techniques cultivate meta-
awareness and observation of experience. FA 
techniques involve focusing attention on specific 
objects (e.g., mantra, religious pictures, scriptural 
passage), body sensations (e.g., breath), or other 
types of mental events (e.g., imagined images). A 
third subdivision in types of meditation, automat-
ic transcendental meditation, has also been sug-
gested by Travis & Shear (2010). The purpose of 
these techniques involves going beyond the usual 
realm of sensations and experiences to “transcend 
their own activity”.
These broad classifications intend to foster a 
sense of coherence and help draw more general 
conclusions about the effects and workings of 
meditation. This would be achieved by separating 
clearly different entities present in the realm of 
meditation. The authors of both the original clas-
sification (Lutz et al. 2008) and its revision (Travis 
& Shear, 2010) mentioned the fact that the dif-
ferent categories are neither exclusive from each 
other nor constant during a meditation session, 
between types of session, or even across practitio-
ners. Such intricacies have yet to be explored by 
research and should be brought forward in future 
efforts to better characterize the phenomenology 
of meditation. 
1.3 Comparison
Some nuances must be mentioned in order to 
understand the subtleties that differentiate hyp-
nosis and meditation and to avoid a black and 
white portrait of similarities and discrepancies. 
These nuances must be kept in mind throughout 
the present review in order to maintain a criti-
cal eye on the reviewed literature, as the studies 
themselves do not always take these factors into 
consideration.
Both hypnosis and meditation experienc-
ers feel qualitative changes in mental function-
ing such that their consciousness is distinct from 
the way it usually operates (Tart, 1972). Other 
elements common to both neutral hypnosis and 
meditation include relaxation, attentional fo-
cus, concentration, and absorption (Holroyd, 
2003; Otani, 2003). In addition, both hypnosis 
and meditation are associated with alterations in 
self-awareness, time sense, and perception (Ott, 
2007). An interesting parallel to draw between 
both states is the importance of the capacity to 
immerse one’s phenomenological experience in a 
particular object. Regarding hypnosis, absorption 
capacity has been strongly correlated to hypnoti-
sability numerous times and is thought by some 
researchers to be a core component of hypnosis 
(Cardena, 1991; Nadon et al. 1991; Green & Lynn 
2010).  Absorption also seems to be linked to 
meditation (Davidson et al. 1976).
Both hypnosis and meditation can be either 
self- or externally- induced. In the case of hypno-
sis, the traditional way is to be brought into hyp-
nosis by a hypnotist but it is possible for someone 
to learn to hypnotize themselves or to follow a 
recording instead of an actual human being. As 
for meditation, while typically this activity is self-
initiated and self-monitored, it also often involves 
a teacher that will guide the practitioner’s mental 
activity before or during meditation. Halsband et 
al. (2009) argued that social interactions were a 
differentiating point between both states but the 
preceding facts (self-hypnosis, guided medita-
tion, etc.) cast doubt on this clear cut distinction.
Traditionally, hypnosis has been seen in the 
terms of enhanced response to suggestions, yet it is 
also possible to undergo “neutral hypnosis” with-
out specific suggestions. Both components — neu-
tral hypnosis and targeted suggestions — often fail 
to be distinguished within the studies discussed 
further, but it will be mentioned throughout the 
review if the original authors addressed such nu-
ances. The specific role of suggestion in medita-
tion is far from being as clearly determined in the 
scientific literature (for in-depth discussions on 
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this topic, see Lynn et al., this issue; Farb et al., 
this issue). Indeed it might be argued that medita-
tors use a form of self-suggestion to attain and/
or maintain a meditative state, or that the words 
of a meditation teacher constitute suggestions (let 
alone the question of how similar these sugges-
tions might be to those used in hypnosis).
2. Functional neuroimaging 
studies of hypnosis
2.1. Visual perception and conver-
sion paralysis
In a seminal study, Kosslyn et al. (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert, & 
Spiegel, 2000) sought to determine whether hyp-
notic suggestion could influence the brain mecha-
nisms underlying visual perception. While being 
scanned using positron emission tomography 
(PET), highly hypnotizable participants viewed 
two visual patterns and were instructed to per-
ceive them in the four following ways: a colour 
pattern in colour, an identical colour pattern as 
gray-scale, a gray-scale pattern as gray-scale, and 
an identical gray-scale pattern as brightly co-
loured. Following a hypnotic induction and sug-
gestion (when compared to normal wakefulness), 
areas in both hemispheres associated with colour 
processing (in the fusiform/lingual region) were 
activated when subjects were instructed to per-
ceive colour, regardless of whether they were in 
fact shown the colour or the gray-scale stimulus. 
Activation of these colour-associated areas was 
diminished when subjects were asked to see gray 
scale, whether they were actually presented with 
colour or gray-scale stimuli. 
McGeown et al. (2012) conducted a follow-up 
study to see if the effects obtained by Kosslyn et 
al. (2000) were attributable to response to sug-
gestion regardless of the induction procedure. 
To do so, they presented both high and low sug-
gestibles with identical suggestions in and out 
of hypnosis. Following the subjective reports 
of colour perception, responses to suggestion 
in normal wakefulness were indistinguishable 
from responses to an identical suggestion follow-
ing hypnotic induction. Compared to low sug-
gestibles, highly suggestible individuals showed 
stronger responses to suggestions both in and out 
of hypnosis. Behaviourally, only suggestibility in-
fluenced the response to the suggestion, despite 
the presence or absence of hypnotic induction. 
However, when looking at the fMRI data within 
the highly suggestible participants, different acti-
vations (namely in the left inferior occipital gyrus, 
both middle occipital gyri and various other re-
gions at the voxel level, several of which were in 
the DMN*) were present following suggestion in 
hypnosis compared to suggestion in normal wak-
ing consciousness. This evidence highlights the 
difficulty of dissociating the added contribution 
of hypnotic induction to altered color perception 
but eloquently replicates the power of suggestion 
in modulating perception. 
Other researchers have attempted to measure 
the neural correlates of hypnosis-induced paral-
ysis.  In one study, Pyka and co-workers (Pyka, 
Burgmer, Lenzen, Pioch, Dannlowski, Pfleiderer, 
Ewert et al., 2011) scanned highly suggestible sub-
jects with fMRI to investigate brain activity me-
diating hypnotic left-hand paralysis. Hypnotic 
induction began with suggestions such as “the 
left hand feels weak, heavy.” These suggestions 
were followed by direct suggestions such as “the 
left hand is paralyzed, you cannot move the hand 
anymore.”  Subjects under hypnotic suggestion 
reported feeling that they were not able to move 
their left hands. Interestingly, the left-hand paral-
ysis induced by hypnosis was not associated with 
activation of brain areas involved in the inhibi-
tion of movement. Indeed, functional connectivi-
ty analyses revealed enhanced connectivity of the 
precuneus with the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), a cortical area known to be in-
volved in cognitive control (Frith, 2000).  Pyka 
et al. (2011) argued that the increased coupling 
of the precuneus supports the view that hypnotic 
paralysis may be related to an altered representa-
tion of the self which affects motor abilities. These 
researchers further proposed that the increased 
coupling of the right DLPFC with the precuneus 
may support the idea that hypnotic paralysis of 
the left hand was maintained by cognitive con-
trol processes implemented by the contralateral 
DLPFC. Similar results were obtained by Cojan 
and collaborators (Cojan et al. 2011) using a go/
no-go task. In half of the blocks, a hypnotic in-
duction was followed by suggestion of paralysis 
of the left hand. A control group was also asked to 
feign hand paralysis to account for willful with-
holding of the movement (though when read-
ing the instructions that were given, it could be 
argued that a suggestion had been made). Even 
when under induced paralysis, preparatory mo-
tor activity was still found but activity from M1 
was decoupled from the activity in the premotor 
areas and functional connectivity was increased 
in the precuneus. These findings support the no-
tion that modifications in self-monitoring are at 
play when eliciting suggested rather than willed 
behaviour.
 
* See McGeown et al. (2012) 
for an extensive list of these 
regions
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2.2. Pain
Pain is a multi-dimensional experience that in-
cludes sensory-discriminative, cognitive, emo-
tional, and behavioural components (Price, 1996; 
Peyron et al., 2000; Knudsen et al., 2011). These 
various components are mediated by neural cir-
cuits commonly referred to as the “pain matrix” 
(Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000). This 
functional brain network involves the brain-
stem, thalamus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), primary (S1) and secondary (S2) somato-
sensory cortices. Neuroimaging findings support 
the contention that two distinct neural circuits are 
implicated in pain perception. On this view, the 
somatosensory thalamus (lateral thalamic nuclei) 
and its projections to the primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortices are involved in the sen-
sory component of pain, whereas the emotional 
component implicate the medial thalamic nuclei 
and its projections to the ACC and prefrontal cor-
tices (Hofbauer, Rainville, Duncan, & Bushnell, 
2001). As for the insula, this cerebral structure 
acts as an intermediary between the sensory and 
emotional components of pain (Augustine, 1996).
Rainville et al. (Rainville, Duncan, Price, 
Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997) used PET and hypnosis 
to investigate the cerebral structures involved in 
the emotional aspect of pain. Hypnotic sugges-
tions were given to healthy subjects to change 
the unpleasantness of noxious stimuli (“pain-
fully hot” water) without altering the perceived 
intensity. The levels of activation within the ACC 
were consistent with the perceived unpleasant-
ness of these noxious stimuli, whereas primary 
somatosensory cortex activation was unaffected. 
Rainville and colleagues (Rainville, Hofbauer, 
Paus, Duncan, Bushnell, & Price, 1999) utilized 
PET also to explore the neural mechanisms un-
derlying hypnotic states and responses to hypnot-
ic suggestions. Regional cerebral blood flow was 
measured during rest (Baseline), hypnotic relax-
ation alone (Hypnosis), and hypnotic relaxation 
with suggestions (Hypnosis-with-Suggestion) for 
altered pain unpleasantness. Subjects had their left 
hand immersed in neutral or hot water — in the 
Baseline and Hypnosis conditions — and in pain-
fully hot water in the Hypnosis-with-Suggestion 
condition. In this condition, suggestions for High 
or Low pain unpleasantness were given to the 
subjects.  Results revealed that hypnosis was ac-
companied by both rCBF increases (in occipital 
areas, inferior frontal gyri, right anterior cingu-
late sulcus, right anterior superior temporal gy-
rus, and left insula) and rCBF decreases (in the 
right inferior parietal lobule, medial precuneus, 
left posterior cingulate gyrus, left medial superior 
frontal gyrus, and left posterior middle temporal 
areas). Likewise, hypnosis-with-suggestions (for 
both High and Low pain unpleasantness) resulted 
in widespread increases (in medial superior and 
left dorsolateral areas of the frontal lobes, right 
dorsolateral frontal areas, left medial posterior 
parietal areas, and left nucleus accumbens) and 
decreases (in the right uncus, bilateral posterior 
orbitofrontal areas, and left lateral cerebellum) 
in rCBF. Rainville et al (1999) proposed that the 
occipital increases in rCBF seen in the Hypnosis 
condition reflect an altered state of consciousness 
associated with possible facilitation of visual im-
agery. These researchers also speculated that the 
frontal increases in rCBF associated with sugges-
tions for altered pain perception might be related 
to the verbal mediation of the suggestions, work-
ing memory, and top–down processes implicated 
in the reinterpretation of the perceptual experi-
ence of pain. This conclusion is in line with the 
results of a recent fMRI study (Raij, Numminen, 
Närvänen, Hiltunen, & Hari, 2009), which sought 
to examine the neural correlates of hypnotic-
suggestion-induced pain (during laser-induced 
pain). The level of activation, measured by blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, in the 
right DLPFC during initiation of suggestion for 
pain was found to be positively correlated with 
the subjective intensity of the subsequent sugges-
tion-induced pain. In this case, hypnotic sugges-
tions modulated reactions on an emotional level 
rather than on a perceptual level, confirming the 
importance of reappraisal in response to these 
suggestions.
Some investigators have combined experien-
tial measures (e.g., self-rating of subjective expe-
rience; Varela & Shear, 1999) and functional brain 
imaging to address the neurophenomenology of 
hypnotic states. For example, Rainville and co-
workers (Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, Duncan, 
& Price, 2002) used PET to scan healthy volun-
teers before and after the induction of hypnosis. 
In these two conditions, subjects rated their per-
ceived level of ‘‘mental relaxation’’ and ‘‘mental 
absorption,’’ two of the crucial aspects charac-
terizing the experience of being hypnotized. The 
subject’s left hand was submerged in either warm 
or painfully hot water.  In the hypnotic state, rCBF 
increases were noted in the left insula, occipital 
lobes, superior frontal and orbitofrontal areas, 
and ACC (middle, rostral, perigenual), whereas 
decreases in rCBF were observed in the right in-
ferior parietal lobule and precuneus. Increases 
in mental relaxation were correlated with rCBF 
increases in the middle and perigenual ACC and 
rCBF decreases in the mesencephalic tegmentum 
of the brainstem and the thalamus. Rainville et 
al. (2002) speculated that the negative correla-
tions in the mesencephalic brainstem and thala-
mus may reflect the involvement of these cerebral 
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structures in the regulation of wakefulness and 
cortical arousal. In other respects, increases in 
mental absorption during hypnosis were associ-
ated with rCBF increases in a distributed network 
of cortical (e.g., rostral ACC, right inferior fron-
tal gyrus) and subcortical (e.g., thalamus, upper 
pons) structures critically involved in the brain’s 
attentional system. Overall, these findings indi-
cate that, in the context of pain modulation, the 
basic alterations in subjective experience pro-
duced by hypnotic induction (without overt sug-
gestion for pain reduction) are mediated, at least 
in part, by modulation of activity within brain 
regions playing a pivotal role in self-monitoring 
and the control of conscious states (Rainville et 
al., 2002).
Other research teams have sought to iden-
tify the neural mechanisms responsible for hyp-
notic analgesia. For instance, Schulz-Stubner et 
al. (Schulz-Stübner, Krings, Meister, Rex, Thron, 
& Rossaint, 2004) used fMRI to measure BOLD 
signal changes induced by thermal pain in hyp-
notized subjects. Healthy volunteers had a heat-
ing device put on their skin to determine the 
temperature at which each of them felt a com-
parable degree of pain (8 out of 10 on a 0 to 10 
subjective pain scale). Next, the subjects were 
hypnotized and scanned during repeated painful 
heat stimulation. Brain activity was recorded also 
when subjects were not hypnotized during pain-
ful heat stimulation. Under hypnosis, all subjects 
experienced a significant pain reduction (down 
to less than 3 on the self-reported pain scale) in 
response to the painful heat. These subjective 
reductions were accompanied by decreased acti-
vations in regions of the pain network including 
S1 and the middle cingulate gyrus. Increased ac-
tivation was seen in the left ACC. No activation 
was detected within the brainstem and thalamus. 
These observations suggest that hypnosis, even 
without the presence of overt analgesic sugges-
tion (but with mental imagery), may prevent pain 
signals from reaching higher cortical structures 
implicated in the conscious perception of painful 
stimulation (Schulz-Stubner et al., 2004). These 
findings are in good agreement with those of an-
other fMRI study carried out on healthy volun-
teers (Vanhaudenhuyse, Boly, Balteau, Schnakers, 
Moonen, Luxen, Lamy et al., 2009). In this inves-
tigation, painful stimuli (induced by a laser) acti-
vated the brainstem, thalamus, ACC, striatum, in-
sula, DLPFC, and contralateral S1. In the hypnotic 
state, and without overt analgesic suggestions, 
the painful stimuli failed to produce significant 
activation in these regions. Thus, the combined 
evidence indicates that hypnotic induction seems 
sufficient to exert a reappraisal effect on the emo-
tional component of pain. 
2.3. Default mode network 
Recent work by Oakley and colleagues suggests 
that modulations of the default mode network 
(DMN; a network of brain regions that show 
more activity at rest, i.e. in absence of goal-direct-
ed behaviour or external stimulation (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008)) might be a 
promising avenue to explore for scientists who 
wish to elucidate neural markers of a putative 
hypnotic state (Oakley, 2008; Oakley & Halligan, 
2009). Since then, a few studies have explored 
hypnosis in relation to activity in the DMN.
McGeown and colleagues (McGeown, 
Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009) pointed out 
that the experimental design adopted in a num-
ber of neuroimaging studies of hypnosis does 
not allow for discrimination between changes 
in brain activity resulting from the hypnotic in-
duction procedure and changes arising from 
task-related suggestions. These researchers pro-
posed an alternative approach to attenuate the 
confounding effect of task demand characteris-
tics and performance expectations:  to scan sub-
jects during rest periods following the hypnotic 
induction procedure (that is, while they are not 
performing any specific task). Using such an ap-
proach, McGeown et al. measured the patterns 
of brain activation and deactivation of high and 
low suggestible individuals, while resting in a 
MRI scanner, both in and out of hypnosis. When 
hypnotized, highly suggestible subjects showed a 
reduction of brain activity in the anterior parts 
of the DMN (ACC, medial and superior frontal 
gyri, left inferior and middle frontal gyri). No 
detectable changes in DMN areas were noted 
when low suggestible subjects underwent the 
same hypnosis-inducing procedure. In contrast 
to the default mode, which has been associated 
with mind-wandering and internally-directed at-
tention (Buckner et al., 2008; Mason et al., 2007), 
hypnosis has been described as a state of readi-
ness to respond to whatever suggestions are made 
by the hypnotist (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Tellegen, 
1981). In this context, McGeown et al (2009) pos-
tulated that diminished levels of anterior default 
mode activity during resting periods following 
hypnotic induction indicate that high suggestible 
individuals may be able to suspend spontaneous, 
non-goal-directed cognitive activity.
Demertzi and co-workers (Demertzi, Soddu, 
Faymonville, Bahri, Gosseries, Vanhaudenhuyse 
et al., 2011) have used independent component 
analysis (ICA) on resting state fMRI acquisitions 
to assess functional connectivity between DMN 
regions during neutral hypnosis. As compared 
with a control condition of autobiographical 
mental imagery, hypnosis produced enhanced 
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connectivity in angular and middle frontal gyri, 
and reduced connectivity in posterior midline 
and parahippocampal structures. Demertzi et al 
(2011) posited that these functional connectivity 
changes between DMN regions reflected an al-
tered “self ” awareness and posthypnotic amnesia. 
This is partly supported by the fact that subjective 
reports of the occurrence of external thoughts 
were significantly decreased in the hypnosis con-
dition.  But an absence of direct evidence towards 
“self ” awareness and amnesia in the present study 
mitigates their conclusions. 
Lipari and collaborators (Lipari et al. 2011) in-
vestigated the extent of DMN involvement under 
pure or neutral hypnosis in a particularly highly 
hypnotizable, or virtuoso, subject using both EEG 
and fMRI in order to assess how specific or attrib-
utable that involvement was to hypnosis. Resting 
state activity was assessed in a normal wakeful 
state before hypnotic induction and again under 
hypnosis without other suggestions (other than 
those used during the induction, including “let 
your mind go” and “your mind must not know.”) 
Posterior DMN (in areas including the precu-
neus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, the retrosple-
nial cortex, the IPL and PH) BOLD signal was in-
creased under hypnosis while anterior DMN (in 
areas including the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
middle frontal gyrus and the ACC) BOLD signal 
was diminished during hypnosis. Activity outside 
of the DMN (in motor and visual areas) was also 
observed during hypnosis despite the lack of sug-
gestions that could elicit such activity. This could 
be attributed to singularities of the virtuoso and 
is coherent with the exhaustion she felt following 
the hypnotic session.  But these results complicate 
the hypothesis that neutral hypnosis can be best 
described as a modulation of the DMN. Another 
interesting point is the fact that the decreased ac-
tivity in anterior areas, also related to the sense 
of self and self-monitoring (Rainville et al., 1999) 
are consistent with the phrases “let your mind go” 
and “your mind doesn’t know” used during the 
hypnotic induction phase.
Taken together, these results appear con-
sistent with the initial report of McGeown et al. 
(2009) and suggest that the DMN is involved in 
a distinct manner during neutral hypnosis. A 
consistent anterior DMN involvement seem to 
emerge from the findings, even if it two of the 
three studies reviewed show decreased activation 
(McGeown et al., 2012; Lipari et al., 2011; see also 
recent evidence from Deeley et al. 2012) while the 
other reported increased connectivity (Demertzi 
et al. 2011). The role of the posterior DMN might 
be an interesting avenue to explore but has only 
been witnessed in one virtuoso subject (Lipari 
et al. 2011). Importantly, it is difficult to say if the 
changes in DMN are related to a special hypnotic 
state or rather to specific suggestions employed 
during the induction procedure.  
2.4. Summary
Findings from functional neuroimaging stud-
ies demonstrate that hypnotic suggestions can 
modulate the neural activity supporting colour 
perception and the experience of painful stim-
uli. There is also some evidence indicating that 
suggestions of hypnotic analgesia can result in a 
reduction of activity in certain areas of the pain 
matrix.  The situation is more complicated with 
regard to the neural correlates of the putative 
hypnotic state. Indeed, while some findings indi-
cate that there is a reduction of activity in various 
regions of the PFC following hypnotic induction 
(McGeown et al., 2009), other findings indicate 
that hypnosis (without suggestions) may be me-
diated by increased activity in distinct prefrontal 
cortical areas (Rainville et al., 1999). Nonetheless 
it seems that neutral hypnosis is associated with a 
distinct anterior alteration of the DMN.
3. Functional neuroimaging 
studies of meditation
3.1. Basic neural substrates
In recent years, many functional imaging studies 
have explored the neural correlates of different 
types of meditation, including OM, FA, transcen-
dental, or even mixed meditative practices. In a pi-
lot investigation, Newberg et al. (Newberg, Alavi, 
Baime, Pourdehnad, Santanna, & d’Aquili, 2001) 
scanned eight experienced Tibetan Buddhist 
meditators with single photon emission comput-
ed tomography (SPECT) while they focused their 
attention on a mental image. They were scanned 
twice, once during meditation and once during 
normal resting wakefulness. Experientially, the 
meditators reported “becoming one with” the vi-
sualized image during the meditative state. The 
baseline activation patterns revealed a difference 
in the thalamic laterality index in which medita-
tors displayed a greater rightward dominance of 
thalamic rCBF compared to controls. Increased 
rCBF was measured in the cingulate gyrus, infe-
rior and orbital frontal cortex, DLPFC, midbrain, 
and thalamus during meditation relative to base-
line. In addition, decreased rCBF activity in the 
left posterior superior parietal lobe was negatively 
correlated with the activity increase noted in left 
DLPFC. Newberg and colleagues suggested that 
the increased frontal rCBF may reflect focused 
concentration while thalamic increases may be 
correlated with increased cortical activity during 
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meditation. These researchers also proposed that 
midbrain activation may be related to alterations 
in autonomic activity during meditation, and that 
the negative correlation between the left posterior 
superior parietal lobe and the left DLPFC may re-
flect an altered sense of space experienced during 
meditation. Other interpretations of these results 
include the notion of an internal vs external focus 
of attention.
In another study of concentrative meditation, 
Brefczynski-Lewis and colleagues (Brefczynski-
Lewis, Lutz,, Schaefer, Levinson, & Davidson, 
2007) used fMRI to examine the neural correlates 
of ‘‘one-pointed concentration’’ — a form of FA 
meditation that is practiced to increase attention-
al focus and reach a peaceful state in which preoc-
cupation with thoughts and emotions is progres-
sively diminished. The researchers compared a 
group of Tibetan Buddhist monks with extensive 
meditation experience to a group of age-matched 
novice meditators. Subjects were instructed to fo-
cus on a small fixation dot presented on a screen. 
Results showed that activation in brain regions 
normally implicated in visual sustained attention 
(e.g., FEF, both interparietal sulci, middle cingu-
late cortex, anterior insula, thalamus and lateral 
occipital) was generally more robust for the ex-
pert meditators compared to novices. However, 
whereas the monks with an average of 19,000 
hours of practice (intermediate) exhibited greater 
activation in these regions than the novices, the 
monks with an average of 44,000 practice hours 
(advanced) showed less activation*. This pattern 
of results fits well with traditional descriptions 
which present concentration meditation as ini-
tially requiring higher levels of effortful concen-
tration but eventually becoming less effortful, 
such that later phases of this meditative practice 
necessitate minor effort (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 
2007). Given this finding it becomes even more 
difficult to compare the neural correlates found 
in the different studies due to the inherent differ-
ences at various points of the learning process of 
the meditator.
FMRI has also been utilized to investigate 
brain changes associated with open monitor-
ing (OM), or mindfulness, meditation. For in-
stance, Ives-Deliperi et al. (Ives-Deliperi, Solms, 
& Meintjes, 2011) scanned healthy volunteers who 
had practiced daily mindfulness meditation for 
a minimum of four years. Subjects were scanned 
while performing a control task (random gen-
eration of numbers) and mindfulness meditation. 
In the mindful condition, subjects were asked 
to be aware of present-moment bodily sensa-
tions, thoughts and emotions without judging 
or reacting to these physical and mental events. 
Significant BOLD signal decreases were recorded 
during mindfulness meditation relative to the 
control condition in midline cortical structures 
associated with interoception, including the pre-
cuneus, right medial PFC, and left ventral ACC, 
and also the anterior insula. According to Ives-
Deliperi and colleagues (2011), these findings 
indicate that mindfulness has an overall “quiet-
ing” effect on brain regions associated with the 
subjective and cognitive aspects of emotions. 
Yet, the task can be seen as an externally directed 
task, while meditation is internally directed, and 
thus, the absence of a neutral resting state control 
limits their findings. These researchers also pro-
posed, as a possible explanation of their results, 
that mindfulness may promote emotional well-
being through a process of disidentification. Such 
a process would allow mindfulness practitioners 
to realize that thoughts and feelings are transient 
mental events that do not define a substantial self 
(Martin, 1997).
The previously reviewed studies all present-
ed different meditation techniques. Given that 
the instructions or tasks performed during the 
meditation conditions are quite different, one 
can rightfully argue that the inconsistent find-
ings are due to that very fact.   In a recent fMRI 
investigation, Manna and co-workers (Manna, 
Raffone, Perrucci, Nardo, Ferretti, Tartaro et al., 
2010) contrasted the neural correlates of concen-
trative and mindfulness meditation techniques 
within the same experiment. Theravada Buddhist 
monks, expert in both Samatha (concentrative, 
FA) and Vipassana (mindfulness, OM) practic-
es (range of experience with meditation: 25–53 
years), participated in the study. In the concentra-
tive meditation condition, subjects were asked to 
“observe and recognize any experiential or men-
tal content as it arises from moment to moment, 
without restrictions and judgement, including 
breath and body sensations, percepts of external 
stimuli, arising thoughts and feelings” (p. 47). In 
the mindfulness meditation condition, subjects 
were instructed to focus their attention on breath 
sensations. 
Compared to a resting state, the concentra-
tive meditation condition revealed a widespread 
pattern of deactivation in the left hemisphere 
(lateral anterior PFC, anterior and posterior in-
sula, and precuneus) and right hemisphere (in-
ferior frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus). 
Additionally, activity was observed in the dor-
sal ACC and right medial anterior PFC. As for 
the mindfulness meditation condition (relative 
to rest), activations were noted in the left hemi-
sphere, medial anterior PFC, superior temporal 
gyrus, and superior parietal lobule. 
 
* It is important to specify 
that an extensive and long-
term commitement to 
meditation is necessary to 
attain a certain mastery of 
the discipline. It is the main 
reason why a separation can 
be drawn between practitio-
nners who all seem to have 
plenty of experience in the 
eye of the layperson.
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While no significant differences were found 
when comparing mindfulness and concentrative 
meditation among beginners, advanced medita-
tors showed more activity during mindfulness in 
the left DLPFC, bilateral  anterior prefrontal cor-
tices, left medial frontal gyrus, left precuneus, left 
superior parietal lobule, left anterior insula, right 
infero-frontal gyrus and transverse temporal gy-
rus. A greater BOLD activation was found during 
concentrative meditation in the right dorsal ACC 
and right medial anterior prefrontal cortex. These 
results indicate that expert meditators cognitive-
ly engage in conscious processing of sensations, 
thoughts, and emotions via self-regulation of 
frontal, parietal, and insular areas in a meditation 
state-dependent manner. Moreover, these results 
suggest that the ACC and the DLPFC play antag-
onistic roles in the executive control of attention 
during meditative states (Manna et al., 2010).
Due to methodological specificities, it is still 
impossible to pinpoint with certainty the neural 
correlates of meditation. Generally speaking, the 
studies reviewed above show a distinct modula-
tion of the attentional networks but the nature 
and the extent of this modulation may fluctuate 
with experience and tradition. Attentional net-
works seem to be recruited differently at various 
stages in the experience of the meditator and, 
once one has sufficient practice, mindfulness and 
concentrative meditation appear to differentially 
engage these circuits. 
3.2. Emotion processing
To investigate the neural mechanisms through 
which mindfulness modulates emotional re-
sponses, Taylor et al. (2011) carried out an fMRI 
study that sought to explore the effects of a mind-
ful state on the neural responses to emotionally 
laden stimuli (Taylor, Grant, Daneault, Scavone, 
Breton, Roffe-Vidal et al., 2011). Another goal of 
this study was to examine the impact of the ex-
tent of mindfulness training on the brain mecha-
nisms supporting the processing of emotional 
stimuli. Experienced and beginner meditators 
were scanned as they viewed negative, positive, 
and neutral pictures in a mindful state and a non-
mindful state of awareness. Mindfulness attenu-
ated emotional intensity perceived from pictures. 
Brain imaging data suggested that this effect was 
achieved through distinct neural mechanisms for 
each group of subjects. For experienced medita-
tors, compared with beginners, mindfulness in-
duced a deactivation of DMN areas (medial pre-
frontal and posterior cingulate cortices) across all 
valence categories, and did not influence respons-
es in structures involved in emotional reactivity 
during emotional processing. On the other hand, 
for beginners relative to experienced meditators, 
mindfulness induced a down-regulation of the 
left amygdala during emotional processing. These 
findings suggest that the long-term practice of 
mindfulness leads to emotional stability by pro-
moting acceptance of emotional states and en-
hancing present-moment awareness, rather than 
by eliciting control over low-level affective cere-
bral systems from higher-order cortical brain re-
gions (Taylor et al., 2011).
3.3. Pain
Similarly to hypnosis, meditation has been shown 
to be highly effective is in its ability to reduce 
the intensity and emotional perception of pain. 
With respect to this issue, Grant and colleagues 
(Grant, Courtemanche, & Rainville, 2011) used 
fMRI to examine the brains of Zen meditators 
during painful stimulation. To induce pain, ther-
mal stimuli were applied to the inner surface of 
the left calf. During pain induction, meditators 
showed greater activation of primary pain pro-
cessing regions (ACC, thalamus, insula), com-
pared to controls. In addition, in meditators 
relative to controls, decreased activity was found 
in appraisal and emotion areas (e.g., lateral and 
medial PFC, amygdala and posterior cingulate 
cortex) during the administration of the painful 
stimuli. Furthermore, reductions in functional 
connectivity between executive and pain-related 
cortices strongly predicted lower pain sensitivity 
in meditators. Grant et al.  (2011) hypothesized 
that the disengagement of anterior brain systems 
in meditators may reflect a functional decoupling 
of the cognitive-evaluative and sensory-discrim-
inative components of pain. Such a phenomenon 
would allow Zen meditators to perceive painful 
stimuli in a mindful manner, that is, more neu-
trally from an emotional perspective.
In one investigation conducted by Gard et 
al. (Gard, Hölzel, Sack, Hempel, Lazar, Vaitl, & 
Ott, 2011), mindfulness practitioners and con-
trols were given unpleasant electric shocks in 
the fMRI scanner during a mindful state and a 
control condition. Mindfulness practitioners, but 
not controls, were able to decrease pain unpleas-
antness by 22% during the mindful state. This 
decrease was accompanied by reduced activation 
in the lateral PFC and enhanced activation in 
the right posterior insula during painful stimu-
lation. These findings suggest that mindfulness 
increases sensory processing and diminishes cog-
nitive control, confirming the role of meditation 
in the reduction of cognitive-evaluative aspects 
of pain (Grant et al, 2011). In another investiga-
tion (Zeidan, Martucci, Kraft, Gordon, McHaffie, 
& Coghill, 2011), arterial spin labelling fMRI was 
used to investigate the neural mechanisms by 
which mindfulness modulates pain in healthy 
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individuals. The experiment was performed af-
ter 4 days of mindfulness meditation training. 
Noxious (thermal) stimuli were administered to 
subjects during a restful state and a mindful state. 
Mindfulness significantly diminished pain un-
pleasantness (by 57%) and pain intensity ratings 
(by 40%) relative to the rest condition. Neurally, 
mindfulness meditation decreased pain-related 
activation of the contralateral S1. Mindfulness-
induced decreases in pain intensity ratings were 
correlated with enhanced activity in the ACC and 
anterior insula — cerebral structures implicated 
in the cognitive regulation of pain processing. 
Furthermore, decreases in pain unpleasantness 
ratings were correlated with an activation of the 
orbitofrontal cortex — an area involved in the re-
appraisal of the contextual evaluation of sensory 
events. Reductions in pain unpleasantness ratings 
were also associated with a deactivation of the 
thalamus. Zeidan and co-workers (2011) postulat-
ed that this thalamic deactivation may support a 
gating mechanism implicated in altering interac-
tions between afferent input and executive-order 
brain regions.
One generally robust finding from the find-
ings reviewed above is that mediation can help 
reduce pain, even if the mechanisms supporting 
this process appear to vary according to the extent 
of the experience of the meditator. Indeed, par-
ticipants in the study by Zeidan et al (2011) were 
novices and showed distinct neural mechanisms 
of pain modulation compared to the long-term 
practitioners investigated in other reports (Grant 
et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011). Specifically, whereas 
novices appeared to modulate pain by decreas-
ing activity in sensory processing regions and 
increasing activity in areas associated with cog-
nitive control (Zeidan et al., 2011), experienced 
practitioners achieved similar effects in a seem-
ingly converse manner: enhancing sensory pro-
cessing and down-regulating control mechanisms 
(Grant et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011).  Because the 
studies reviewed in the previous sections showed 
differences attributable to the level of experience 
of meditators, one can reasonably expect that this 
relationship would hold true in the case of pain 
modulation. Even if this claim is presently specu-
lative, these issues could easily be investigated by 
comparing in a single study the processes at work 
during painful stimulation between novice and 
expert meditators.
3.4. Default mode network
A handful of fMRI studies have examined func-
tional connectivity between DMN areas during 
various types of meditation. In one of these stud-
ies, Josipovic et al. (Josipovic, Dinstein, Weber, & 
Heeger, 2011) recorded the brain activity of expe-
rienced meditators from the Tibetan-Buddhist 
tradition, while they fixated without meditation 
(fixation) or engaged in either non-dual aware-
ness (NDA or transcendental) or FA meditation. 
The anti-correlation between intrinsic (or DMN) 
and extrinsic networks seemed to be stronger in 
FA than in rest, and lower in NDA meditation 
when compared to rest. On the other hand, cor-
relation between areas within the DMN did not 
change during NDA meditation and FA medi-
tation, relative to fixation without meditation. 
In another investigation, Brewer and colleagues 
(Brewer, Worhunsky, Gray, Tang, Weber, & Kober, 
2011) measured brain activity in experienced 
meditators and matched meditation-naïve con-
trols as they performed three distinct meditations 
[Concentration (FA), Loving-Kindness (prac-
ticed through directed well-wishing;) Choiceless 
Awareness (OM or attention to whatever arises in 
one’s conscious field of awareness at any moment)] 
(Gunaratana, 2002). Across all meditation types, 
experienced meditators showed deactivation in 
core regions of the DMN (medial prefrontal and 
posterior cingulate cortices). Moreover, a greater 
coupling in experienced meditators was found 
between cortical areas of the DMN thought to be 
involved in self-monitoring and cognitive control 
(posterior cingulate, dorsal ACC, and DLPFC), 
both at baseline (restful state) and during medita-
tion. This account also reported a relative absence 
of involvement of the extrinsic network, which is 
coherent with the supposed absence of stimulus-
independent thoughts achieved in meditation. In 
addition, the consistency of connectivity patterns 
within DMN areas across meditation and base-
line periods indicates that meditation practice 
may alter the resting-state experience such that it 
is similar to a meditative state (Brewer et al., 2011). 
The increased connectivity within the DMN, yet 
lowered activity, seems to point towards a more 
efficient recruitment of this network.
Aiming to confirm the notion that medita-
tion alters the efficiency of DMN recruitment, 
Jang and co-workers (Jang, Jung, Kang, Byun, 
Kwon, Choi, & Kwon, 2011) employed fMRI to 
investigate functional connectivity within the 
DMN during a resting state (fixation on a foveal 
crosshair). Healthy controls and “brain-wave vi-
bration meditation” practitioners were recruited. 
Brain-wave vibration meditation is believed to 
help quiet the mind and release negative emotions 
through focusing on bodily sensations while per-
forming natural rhythmic movements.  Thus, this 
form of meditation likely reflects a combination 
of both FA and OM practice. At rest, meditation 
practitioners showed greater functional coupling 
within the DMN in the medial prefrontal cortex 
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area than did the control subjects. This suggests 
that the long-term practice of meditation may 
lead to functional alterations in DMN activ-
ity, even when meditation is not being practiced. 
Such a conclusion is consistent with the find-
ings of a fMRI study recently conducted Taylor, 
Daneault et al. (2012). In this investigation, rest-
ing-state data were collected from experienced 
mindfulness meditators and beginner meditators 
(trained for one week before the study). Relative 
to beginners, experienced meditators had weaker 
functional connectivity between DMN regions 
involved in self-referential processing and emo-
tional appraisal. Moreover, experienced medita-
tors had increased connectivity between certain 
other DMN regions (e.g., posterior cingulate cor-
tex/precuneus and right inferior parietal lobule), 
compared to beginner meditators. These findings 
suggest that meditation training leads to func-
tional connectivity changes between core DMN 
regions, possibly reflecting strengthened present-
moment awareness, accompanied by a reduction 
in self-referential thoughts during rest. These 
findings also reinforce the idea that mindfulness 
training leads to changes in the functional dy-
namics of the DMN that extend beyond a state of 
meditation per se. Overall, therefore, meditation 
seems to influence the DMN both during and af-
ter practice, but it might have distinct impacts on 
regions related to self-referential and emotional 
appraisal, depending on the type of meditation 
practiced.
3.5. Brain structure 
Many long-term outcomes have been associated 
with meditation and, in accordance with recent 
findings in neuroplasticity, it is logical to hypoth-
esise that meditation might have a tangible impact 
on brain structure. Several studies in recent years 
have shown plastic gray matter changes in brain 
regions previously associated with meditation; 
namely in the brainstem (Vestergaard-Poulsen et 
al., 2009), in the hippocampus and frontal lobes 
(Luders et al., 2009), and in the left inferior tem-
poral gyrus and right hippocampus (Hölzel et al., 
2008). Furthermore, age-related decreases in gray 
matter usually observed in normal adults seems 
to be slowed or reversed in advanced meditators, 
which is to say that meditation might have a pro-
tective effect on the brain (Lazar et al., 2005; Ott 
et al., 2011). Finally, studies employing diffusor 
tension imaging and fractional anisotropy also re-
port increased cortical thickness and thicker cal-
losal regions, confirming the long term impact of 
meditation on the brain (Kang et al., 2012; Luders 
et al., 2012).
3.6. Summary
Globally, the findings from functional neuro-
imaging investigations indicate that concentra-
tive meditation techniques are accompanied by 
enhanced activity in cortical areas known to be 
involved in sustained attention. With respect to 
the neural correlates of mindfulness, however, 
brain imaging studies present conflicting results. 
Effectively, whereas some investigations suggest 
that mindfulness is mediated by an overall de-
crease in brain activity (e.g., Ives-Deliperi et al., 
2011), the results of other investigations indicate 
instead that this form of meditation is correlated 
with enhanced activity in various prefrontal, pa-
rietal, and temporal regions (e.g., Manna et al., 
2010). Findings from other studies suggest that 
meditation can influence neural activity support-
ing the processing of emotional (Taylor et al., 
2011) and painful (Grant et al., 2011; Gard et al., 
2011; Zeidan et al., 2011) stimuli. Still, there are 
consistent effects of meditation on processes in-
volving the DMN and compelling evidence that 
meditation leads to enduring changes in brain 
structure. 
4. Concluding remarks and 
future directions
In this article, we have reviewed a number of 
functional neuroimaging studies that have in-
vestigated the neural mechanisms underlying 
the effects of hypnosis and hypnotic suggestion 
on colour perception, hand paralysis, pain, and 
the DMN. We also examined neuroimaging in-
vestigations conducted to identify the neural cor-
relates of different meditation techniques, as well 
as the impact of meditation on the brain mecha-
nisms supporting emotion, pain, and the DMN.
Despite some experiential similarities be-
tween hypnotic and meditative states (e.g., mental 
relaxation, attentional focus, concentration, men-
tal absorption, letting go of thoughts) (Holroyd, 
2003; Otani, 2003; Halsband et al., 2009), the re-
sults of the neuroimaging studies reviewed in this 
paper do not allow us to posit that hypnosis and 
meditation are mediated by similar brain systems 
and neural mechanisms (in contrast to the posi-
tion held by Grant & Rainville, 2005). The com-
parison between the neuroimaging investigations 
of hypnosis and meditation performed in regard 
to pain processing and the DMN will illustrate 
why we reach such a conclusion.  In the case of 
pain processing, it has been demonstrated that 
suggestions of hypnotic analgesia can produce a 
decrease of activity in regions of the pain matrix 
(e.g., S1, middle cingulate gyrus) (Schulz-Stübner 
68 || MBR || Volume : 2 || Issue : 1
ar t ic le The Journal of Mind–Body Regulation
m
br
.s
yn
er
gi
es
pr
ai
ri
es
.c
a
et al., 2004). In contrast, mindfulness meditation 
has been shown to be associated with increased 
activity in certain pain matrix areas (e.g., ACC, 
insula), depending on the level of training (Grant 
et al., 2011; Gard et al., 2011; Zeidan et al., 2011). 
As for the DMN, a decrease of activity in diverse 
prefrontal cortical areas has been reported dur-
ing a restful state following hypnotic induction 
(McGeown et al., 2009). In addition, increased 
connectivity in angular and middle frontal gyri, 
and decreased connectivity in posterior midline 
and parahippocampal structures, has been found 
during this putative hypnotic state (Demertzi 
et al., 2011). With respect to meditation, Taylor 
et al. (2012) have reported a weaker functional 
connectivity between DMN regions involved 
in self-referential processing and emotional ap-
praisal (dorsomedial PFC, ventromedial PFC, in-
ferior parietal lobule) in experienced mindfulness 
meditators (compared to beginner meditators). 
Furthermore, Taylor et al. (2012) have shown en-
hanced connectivity between other DMN areas 
(posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and right 
inferior parietal lobule) in experienced medita-
tors. The processes through which these outcomes 
are reached likely vary depending on the type of 
meditation and the experience of the meditators.
It is important to point out that considerable 
discrepancy exists among results of neuroimag-
ing studies even within the individual domains 
of hypnosis and meditation.  A number of factors 
might account for such inconsistencies. It should 
come as no surprise that the use of different hyp-
notic suggestions targeting distinct sensory/per-
ceptual systems leads to different patterns of neu-
ral activity (Rainville et al., 1999). Moreover, since 
distinct kinds of mental events/processes are as-
sociated with different brain patterns, the control 
condition is critical when interpreting the results 
from neuroimaging studies of hypnosis (Demertzi 
et al., 2011). In other respects, differing control 
tasks, meditative techniques, and experimental 
designs most certainly contribute to the discrep-
ant findings found in the neuroimaging literature 
on meditation (Ives-Deliperi et al., 2011). The level 
of expertise of the subjects in meditative practices 
and the sample size constitute other potentially 
confounding variables (for a discussion of such 
factors, see Grant, this issue).
Direct comparisons accounting for a wider 
range of variables would be required in order for 
neuroscience to really determine and compare 
the processes at work in hypnosis and medita-
tion.  Such variables could include comparison 
of both states in the same subjects, whether by 
hypnotising advanced meditators or by asking 
highly hypnotisable non-meditators to practice 
meditation. The impact of suggestion while un-
der hypnosis and while meditating could also 
be assessed in order to see if meditation also fa-
cilitates the suggestion effect and if this effect is 
mediated by similar neural mechanisms.  In the 
case of hypnosis, a comparison of the variables of 
interest should be done both under neutral hyp-
nosis and following suggestions in order to deter-
mine the precise contribution and the differential 
workings of both. In the case of meditation, when 
possible, two styles (or two variants of the same 
style) could be compared in the same meditator. 
Another possibility would be to take into account 
a phenomenological report of the content of the 
meditation or hypnosis session in order to con-
trol for the semantic content in terms of beliefs, 
goals, and expectations.
This review aimed to outline and compare 
the neural correlates and processes involved in 
hypnosis and meditation. We reviewed a wide 
range of findings, highlighted significant caveats 
and drew conclusions as to where research should 
head in order to attain a clearer understanding of 
hypnosis and meditation, as well as of their simi-
larities and differences.  Even if the experimental 
control of the critical variables we discuss (e.g., 
attitudes and beliefs, experience of the practitio-
ner, and validity of the control task) might disna-
ture the practices from their usual settings, such 
assays would be necessary to determine if hyp-
nosis and meditation differ only because of these 
particular contexts and come together when 
stripped from them, or are truly different in their 
fundamental workings.
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